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 1 
`VOICES OF THE MUNICH PACT
*
 
 
Munich, like Vietnam, has become a metonym.  If „Vietnam‟ is now shorthand for the 
misconceived cause, obdurately pursued to deadly effect, „Munich‟ has come to connote 
shameful betrayal, weakness and capitulation.
1
  In popular consciousness, Munich has 
visually endured as a text: the small sheet (sign of a signified, the graphemes of not keeping 
one‟s word) waved by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Heston airport on his return 
from the conference on 30 September 1938 (fig. 1).
2
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
 
                                                 
*
 This article is dedicated to Daphne Perry and her family.  I would like to thank Robert Franklin, 
Jennifer Fisher and Willy Maley for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1
 In this article, there is no attempt to delimit the meaning of the word „Munich‟ in any instance. 
2
 From “Munich Agreement,” http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWmunich.htm.  The scenes at 
Heston were televised live: the one and only appearance of a Prime Minister on television before the 
Second World War (“Political Television 1936 – 1955,” http://www.election.demon.co.uk/pt1.html). 
The piece of paper was reproduced in the Times (“Mr. Chamberlain‟s Work,” Times, 1 October 1938, 
14) and now resides in the Public Record Office, Kew.  This edition of the Times also carried 
photographs of Heston, Chamberlain at Buckingham Palace with his wife and the King and Queen and 
at the window of 10 Downing Street (“Enthusiastic Welcome for Mr. Chamberlain,” Times, 1 October 
1938, 7; “The King and Mr. Chamberlain at Buckingham Palace,” Times, 1 October 1938, 16; “Group 
at the Palace,” Times, 1 October 1938, 12).  Times readers could purchase the Buckingham Palace 
picture as a „photogravure plate suitable for framing‟ for 1s. 1½ d. (“The King and Mr. Chamberlain at 
Buckingham Palace”). 
 2 
Later dismissed by Hitler as a „scrap of paper‟,3 what Chamberlain held in his right hand was 
not, in fact, a copy of the Four Power Accord concluded by Britain, France, Germany and 
Italy at Munich, but of the Anglo-German Agreement, hastily signed at the end of the 
conference and later hailed by the Prime Minister from the window of 10 Downing Street.  
„This is the second time that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace 
with honour,‟ Chamberlain told the cheering crowds, „I believe it is peace for our time‟.4  The 
purpose of this essay is to „read‟ the scrap of paper, to unpick the metonym by showing how 
„Munich‟ can be understood as a textual event in negotiation with other texts, past, future and 
contemporary.
5
  This will be a process of listening to „voices‟: some screaming, some politely 
arguing, others charged with emotion, still others murmuring behind the scenes.  Some of 
these voices can still literally be heard, downloadable from the internet:
6
 at the time, the crisis 
itself unfolded as an aural experience, an „anxious / Listening to bulletins / From distant, 
measured voices‟ as Louis MacNeice expressed it in his long poetic rumination on the events 
of September to December 1938, Autumn Journal.
7
  The model is akin to Bakhtin‟s 
heteroglossia, though more real and less theorised: not so much a conversation, fugue or even 
an antiphony, but a multi-volume cacophony of ad hoc responses, deliberate mishearings, 
shoutings down – a diplomatic Totentanz.  These are the verbal equivalents of Michel de 
                                                 
3
 “The Czech Crisis of 1938,” http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/czechoslovakia_1938.htm. “Scrap 
of paper” was first used derisively of a treaty obligation by German Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-1921) in response to British protests before the First World War that she 
was treaty-bound to assist Belgium (Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After, trans. Ida Šindelková and 
Edgar P. Young (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), 85.  Ripka described France‟s failure to honour her 
obligations under the Treaty of Locarno to Czechoslovakia as „scrap of paper diplomacy‟.  Duff 
Cooper, who resigned over Munich, also called the Anglo-German Agreement „that miserable scrap of 
paper‟ (Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), 247). 
4
 Quoted in the Times (“Flowers at No. 10,” Times, 1 October 1938, 14); and in the Guardian on 1 
October 1938 (R. H. Haigh, D. S. Morris, and A. R. Peters, eds. The Guardian Book of Munich 
(Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988), 232).  Chamberlain‟s words are often misquoted as „peace in our 
time‟. 
5
 As Chamberlain hinted, „peace with honour‟ was intertextual, repeating the words of Disraeli on his 
return from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 (a historical analogy picked up by the Times (“Ovation in 
London,” Times, 1 October 1938, 12) and the New York Times (“Chamberlain Flies to Consult Hitler,” 
New York Times, 15 September 1938, 3). 
6
 “The Munich Crisis”, http://www.otr.com/munich.html. 
7
 MacNeice, Louis, Autumn Journal (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 36. 
 3 
Certeau‟s everyday „tactics‟, the age-old ruses and piecemeal subterfuges which, with 
makeshift creativity, make possible the quotidian task of getting by.
8
 
The main speakers in this essay are British, Czech, American and German: Neville 
Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Duff Cooper, Storm Jameson, Edouard Beneš, Hubert 
Ripka, Dorothy Thompson, Helen Kirkpatrick, Edgar Mowrer and Adolf Hitler.  Their 
discourses reveal that, in the course of events leading up to the signature of the Accord, 
politics became a matter of style and style became political.  More specifically, a 
confrontation arose between a way of speaking associated by some with certain „civilised‟ 
values and another way which was the destruction of those values.  Shrieking, ranting, 
nostalgic, elegiac, prophetic, calm, reasoning, strong, emotional, temperate: all these 
modulations sounded in a flurry of textual exchanges.  „Telegrams, phone-calls, messages by 
air came after one another without ceasing,‟ is how one diplomat experienced it.9  Louis 
MacNeice summed it up as „conferences, adjournments, ultimatums / flights in the air, castles 
in the air‟.10  The atmosphere was reactive, an anti-dialogue, a diplomatic game of spillikins 
in which each participant waited for another to move. 
If Munich was contemporaneously experienced as a jangling proliferation of texts, it 
also „speaks‟ diachronically.  Indeed, in attempting to demarcate the Crisis, it is difficult to 
know where to start – or to stop.  Munich „talked‟ to events which came long after it.  
Vietnam was called Richard Nixon‟s Munich after George McGovern‟s trip to Hanoi; Jeane 
Kirkpatrick played the Munich card to justify Ronald Reagan‟s „intervention‟ in Nicaragua‟; 
and, most recently, the failure of Munich-style appeasement has been cited in support of the 
Bush / Blair invasion of Iraq, most notably by Donald Rumsfeld.
11
  (In a key article in the 
Guardian,  Matt Seaton asked a dozen leading historians on both sides of the Atlantic whether 
the Crisis of 1938 was a „plausible parallel‟ for Iraq – eleven, including Linda Colley, Simon 
                                                 
8
 Certeau, Michel de, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California, 1984), xix, xi, xiv. 
9
 W. C. F. von Rheinbaben, “Berlino,” in Quattro Giorni. Storia Di Una Crisa Europea, ed. Michael, 
Lord Killanin (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1938), 177. 
10
 MacNeice, Autumn Journal, 30. 
11
 See Richard Bernstein, “The German Question,” New York Times, 2 May 2004. 
 4 
Schama, Eric Hobsbawm, Avi Shlaim, Paul Kennedy, Michael Burleigh and Norman Davies, 
replied that it was not.)
12
  Textual and historical exchanges in the opposite direction include 
Sir Edward Grey‟s diplomacy in the run-up to the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles, 
the Spanish Civil War and the Austrian Anschluss – Shiela Grant Duff even begins her 
analysis of the crisis with the fourteenth-century Hussites.
13
  The opening of Louis 
MacNeice‟s Autumn Journal, set in August 1938, recalls in elegiac mood the brilliant summer 
of 1914: 
Close and slow, summer is ending in Hampshire, 
 Ebbing away down ramps of shaven lawn where close 
     -clipped yew 
 Insulates the lives of retired generals and admirals.
14
 
 
„It has happened before,‟ MacNeice continues, „just like this before, we must be dreaming.‟15  
The historiographical corollary is that the crisis must be seen, synchronically and 
diachronically, as a discursive profusion: what is proposed here, therefore, is a textualised 
model of history.  To explore that profusion in detail, this essay now tunes in to the varied 
voices of the Munich Pact.   
 
 Events were dominated by the raised voice of Adolf Hitler.  „Hitler yells on the 
wireless,‟ wrote MacNeice, implying that the Führer was „received‟ as an unceasing, 
undifferentiated barrage of noise.
16
  In two key speeches – at Nuremberg and at the Berlin 
Sportspalast – Hitler‟s loud volume and emotive vocabulary stirred up the crowd, which 
responded with equal frenzy („thunderous cheers and shouts of “victory heil”,‟ according to 
                                                 
12
 Matt Seaton, “Blast from the Past,” Guardian, 19 February 2003.  Only one of those polled, the 
right-wing historian Andrew Roberts, claimed that „were the west not to act and Saddam eventually to 
build nuclear bombs, he would have more destructive capacity even than did Hitler‟. 
13
 Grant Duff, Europe and the Czechs, 26. 
14
  MacNeice, Autumn Journal, 9. 
15
 MacNeice, Autumn Journal, 22. 
16
 MacNeice, Autumn Journal, 30. 
 5 
the Times).
17
  This effect itself then became a negotiating card: concessions on the 
Sudetenland were impossible, Hitler said, because of the expectations he had created in the 
German people (expectations reinforced by the equally vehement German media and the 
speeches of other leading Nazis).
18
  In diplomatic exchanges, too, his explosive temperament 
and shouted responses created in his interlocutors a perceptible fear of sparking his temper.  
Appeasement in this sense was not so much a political strategy as an alternative, quieter way 
of speaking: lullaby-like, a kind of hushing.         
  The speech Hitler made at the Nuremberg Rally on 12 September 1938 was aimed at 
gaining discursive-political dominance of the geopolitical situation.  „Herr Beneš indulges in 
tactics,‟ Hitler claimed, „he speaks, he organises negotiations.  This cannot go on.  This is not 
a matter of phrases but of right.‟19  The speech was closely monitored by the British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO).  Sir Nevile Henderson, British ambassador to Berlin, 
advised: 
He [Hitler] is in a condition of extreme nervous tension which he was unable to relax 
even when addressing his Hitler Youth.  His abnormality seemed to me greater than 
ever.
20
 
 
„Driven by megalomania inspired by military force which he has built up etc., he may have 
crossed the border-line of insanity,‟ Henderson suggested to the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Halifax.
21
  Worldwide, the press also reported the speech, in every case remarking on the 
stentorian delivery.  The Times called it „violent in tone‟, full of „extravagant language‟.22  
                                                 
17
 “Herr Hitler‟s Speech,” Times, 13 September 1938, 7. 
18
 „I do feel that it is necessary to recognised the difficulty for a man in that position to take back such 
emphatic declarations as he has already made amidst the enthusiastic cheers of his supporters,‟ 
empathised Neville Chamberlain in his speech to the Commons on 3 October 1938 (Hansard 1937-38, 
vol. 339, col. 47). 
19
 Quoted in the Guardian, 13 September 1938, 11 (Haigh, The Guardian Book of Munich, 101). 
20
 E. L.Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third 
Series. Vol II. 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949), 296. 
21
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 299. 
22
 „Herr Hitler‟s Speech,‟ Times, 13 September 1938, 12;  Times, 13 September 1938, 13. 
 6 
The Guardian referred to its „angry tone‟, „bitter references‟, „strident and aggressive tones‟ 
and „fiery tones‟.23  The New York Herald Tribune observed: 
Millions listened to a single voice shouting its rounded, grandiose, essentially 
meaningless phrases throughout the world.  By turns sarcastic, solemn, and shrill, 
delivered against the roaring background of cadenced „Sieg Heils‟ – for all the world 
like the mindless roars of an American football crowd – it sounded unbelievably 
sinister and violent.
24
 
 
The Czech press‟s reactions were conveyed to the German Foreign Ministry by its Chargé 
d‟Affaires in Prague: „menacing words‟ (Prager Tageblatt), „threatening in tone‟ (Narodni 
Osvobozeni), „impudent strong words‟ (A-Zet), „threatens and insults‟ (Lidove Noviny).25  The 
speech at the Berlin Sportspalast on the evening of 26 September 1938 was similar in tone 
and similarly received.  At around 7 p.m., Henderson wired Halifax that it was a „very violent 
hour.  He [Hitler] is clearly determined to make [a] great passionate speech tonight and was 
most impatient‟.  The Führer was filled with „intense emotion and frequent references to 
tonight‟s speech‟.26  Czech journalist Hubert Ripka described it as „a violent and intimidating 
discourse‟.27  But a German commentator, Baron W. C. F. von Rheinbaben, diplomat, former 
secretary of state and member of the Reichstag, noted: 
No German is capable of describing and expressing better the sentiments and 
thoughts of the people at that moment […] every sentence came from the spirit of the 
people.
28
 
 
                                                 
23
 13 September 1938 11, 14 (Haigh, 101, 103). 
24
 Quoted in the Guardian, 14 September 1938, 13 (Haigh, The Guardian Book of Munich, 114). 
25
 John W. Wheeler-Bennett et al, eds. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D 
(1937-1945) Vol II Germany and Czechoslovakia 1937-1938 (London: HMSO, 1950), 753. 
26
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 552. 
27
 Hubert Ripka, “Praga,” in Quattro Giorni. Storia Di Una Crisa Europea, ed. Michael, Lord Killanin 
(Milan: A. Mondadori, 1938), 104. 
28
 Rheinbaben, “Berlino,” 164. 
 7 
The reaction of the crowd, Rheinbaben argued, was not so much frenzy as „massive 
enthusiasm and agreement‟.29  The inflammatory nature of Hitler‟s language in these two 
speeches was matched by the German press and wireless.  Describing it as „raucous‟, a Times 
editorial on 24 September 1938 commented: 
What might at least have been hoped was that Dr. Goebbels, who is at his Führer‟s 
side, should have been instructed to modify the tone of the German Press, and, not 
less, of the German wireless, which even at this hour, with an almost incredible lack 
of a sense of decency, continue to pour out their venom of threat and invective.
30
 
   
 But at Bad Godesberg, Hitler himself characterised his demagogic oratory as „plain 
speaking‟.  A memo by a German official records the Führer saying that „the whole German 
nation expected energetic action and plain speaking from him‟.31  It was a mistake to assume 
that his Nuremberg speech was merely a set of „empty phrases‟.32  In conference, according to 
FCO notes, Hitler aligned himself with British „control‟.  The temper of the Sudeten German 
refugees was rising „to fever heat‟, he said.  These people could not be expected to view the 
problem with the same equanimity as Mr. Chamberlain and himself in the Conference 
Room.
33
  But, as the Führer spoke, his voice changed.  „Hitler had begun his remarks in 
comparatively moderate tones,‟ wrote the journalist G. J. George, „but the more he said, the 
quicker his words came, the louder his voice […] he does not […] choose his words like a 
di
34
plomat.  It is his habit to say exactly what he thinks.‟35  A fissure began to appear between 
Hitler‟s claim to „equanimity‟ and the agitated nature of his language.  British gentlemen 
                                                 
29
 Rheinbaben, “Berlino,” 168. 
30
 “Facing the Issue,” Times, 24 September 1938, 11. 
31
 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 788. 
32
 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 794. 
33
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 467. 
34
 For an account of tmesis, see <http://rhetoric.byu.edu/>. 
35
 G. I. George. They Betrayed Czechoslovakia (Harmondsworth: Penguin, November 1938), 70. 
George also noted at Berchtesgaden that „Hitler‟s words, as ever, flowed from his lips in a torrent‟ (45).  
It is not known how George knew this, as the only other person present with Hitler and Chamberlain on 
both occasions was the German interpreter, Dr. Schmidt. 
 8 
naturally regarded the Czech question in a purely objective way, he said.
36
  For Germany, on 
the other hand, it was a problem which stirred the country‟s emotions deeply.37  If the Prime 
Minister would only imagine Britain‟s being „enslaved by an inferior people, then his blood 
would surely boil just like that of the Germans in the case of Czechoslovakia‟.38  Sir Horace 
Wilson‟s notes of his conversation with Hitler on the Godesberg Memorandum also record 
the Führer‟s mercurial tone.  Hitler interrupted „to vociferate in staccato accents that the 
problem must be solved forthwith without any delay‟.39  According to Wilson, he made 
„gestures and exclamations of disgust and impatience‟, „angry interjection[s]‟, and 
ejaculations of „Incredible! Amazing!‟40  When Wilson remarked that the Memorandum had 
profoundly shocked the British public, Hitler interrupted again to say that „in that event it was 
no use talking any more.‟41 
 To borrow a rhetorical term, Hitler‟s language was tmetic, cutting through dialogue 
by means of ejaculation, interjection and interruption.  It was also a closing-down of linguistic 
exchange: as Wilson‟s last recorded observation reveals, Hitler was anti-talk.  He both 
shouted down and refused to discuss.  In his resignation speech in the Commons, Duff Cooper 
reflected that the government was always saying that Hitler mustn‟t be „irritated‟.  „It seems 
to me,‟ he continued, „that Herr Hitler never makes a speech save under the influence of 
considerable irritation […] the communication of a solemn fact would have produced a 
sobering effect‟.42  Cooper underlines here that Hitler‟s voice was a political factor – and the 
response it provoked also had significant political consequences. 
 
                                                 
36
 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 900. 
37
 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 900. 
38
 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 795. 
39
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 554. 
40
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 555, 556. 
41
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 554.  Rheinbaben commented that the 
Memorandum was not an ultimatum „but the energetic intonation in which a great and powerful Empire 
solemnly reassures three and a half million Germans beyond its boundaries that in reclaiming their 
rights they will not be alone‟ (Rheinbaben, “Berlino,” 165). 
42
 Hansard 1937-9, vol. 339, col. 33. 
 9 
 Across the aural spectrum from Hitler‟s ranting were the voices of the Czechs.  The 
historian Joseph Frederick Zacek reveals that the terms „Mnichované‟ („Munichites‟) and 
„Mnichovanství‟ („Munichism‟) are pejorative, but Czech views are still not well known – for 
linguistic as well as political reasons.  The Czechs themselves, however, „have done an 
immense amount of talking‟ about „the Munich Trauma‟.43  Much of the country‟s writing on 
the subject has been produced by Marxist historians, with Beneš painted in the 1950s as 
bourgeois „devil-in-chief‟ for handing over the country to Hitler and ignoring Soviet offers of 
help.
44
  This view was relaxed somewhat in the ‟60s as the former President came to be seen 
as more of a tragic figure.
45
  In 1973, the year that a treaty normalised relations between 
Czechoslovakia and West Germany, a colour documentary film, Dny zrdy (Days of Betrayal), 
was released.
46
  The Marxist historian Václav Král criticised its portrayal of Beneš: „it is 
indispensable that [Beneš be judged] soberly, temperately, tactfully, and decently.‟47  In the 
last thirty years, there has been a spurt of fictional and poetic treatments of the crisis: Marie 
Majerová, Cesta blesku (Path of the Lightning) and Sedm hrobů (Seven Graves); František 
Halas, Torso nadĕje (Torso of Hope); V. Nezval, Historický obraz (Historical Image); S. K. 
Neumann and F. Jungmann, eds., Československý podzim: Výbor z poezie 1938 (Czech 
Autumn: A Selection of Poetry 1938); F. Valouch, ed., Česká poezie v období Mnichova 
(Czech Poetry of the Munich Period); Vĕra Holá et al, eds., Mnichov: Vzpomínková kronika 
(Munich: A Chronicle of Memoirs); and František Kubka, Mnichov (Munich).48  „No writer 
[…] has the power to describe the terror and the pain that went through the Czech lands after 
Munich‟ wrote the historian Jan Křen.49  The Czech response was overwhelmingly one of 
grief, bewilderment and shame.  But stylistically, what emerges again and again in accounts 
                                                 
43
 Joseph Frederick Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” in Reappraising the Munich Pact: Continental 
Perspectives, ed. Maya Latynski (Washington and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1992), 47. 
44
 Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 50, 48. 
45
 Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 50. 
46
 Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 54. 
47
 Quoted in Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 54. 
48
 Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 48. 
49
 Quoted in Zacek, “The Czechoslovak View,” 48. 
 10 
of the country‟s reaction to the crisis is control: carefully modulated tones, patient argument, 
calm language. 
Czech feeling was evident, if moderated, in public utterances during the crisis.  One 
of the key voices was Hubert Ripka, diplomatic correspondent of Lidove Noviny, friend of Jan 
Masarýk and in close contact with President Beneš: a Certeauesque figure who operated 
tactically behind the scenes.  In 1939, Ripka published Munich: Before and After, but his 
most immediate response to the crisis is contained in an essay, „Praga‟, collected by Michael, 
Lord Killanin, in Quattro Giorni: Storia di una Crisa Europea (1938).  Ripka observed that 
when the Czechs heard of the Anglo-French proposals on 19 September, „M. Osuský was not 
the only one whose voice broke with emotion and whose eyes were filled with tears‟.50   The 
proposals were finally accepted on 21 September but the official communiqué made clear that 
it was „with feelings of grief‟ („des sentiments de douleur‟ in the French original).51  The 
Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia reported in a telegram to the People‟s Commisariat for 
Foreign Affairs that „astounding scenes are taking place in Prague […] The crowds are 
singing the national anthem and are literally weeping‟.52  Alexander Henderson, 
representative of the Daily Herald in Prague and editorially responsible for the news service 
owned by the Czechoslovak government,
53
 recalled that, at the Prager Presse offices, „a dry, 
hard-headed journalist […] was almost in tears‟.54  Ripka described it as „desperate grief‟: 
„men with iron nerves broke down in utter despair‟.55  Broadcasting after Munich, Prime 
Minister Syrový said that the Czechs accepted the Agreement „with bleeding hearts‟.  This 
was „the bitterest moment of his life‟.56  His speech was followed by the Czech national 
anthem, „the plaintive mournful “Kde Domov Můj”‟.57  On Friday 1 October, as though a 
                                                 
50
 Ripka, Munich: Before and After, 97. 
51
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 447. 
52
 V. F. Klochko, et al, eds, New Documents on the History of Munich (Prague: The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Orbis, 1951), 10. 
53
 Alexander Henderson, Eyewitness in Czechoslovakia (London: George Harrap, 1939), 6. 
54
 Henderson, Eyewitness in Czechoslovakia, 205. 
55
 Ripka, “Praga,” 84; Ripka, Munich: Before and After, 104. 
56
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 641. 
57
 Griffin, 136. 
 11 
national figure had died, all theatres in Prague closed, concerts were cancelled, no bands 
played in cafés and radio stations only broadcast the half-hourly news bulletins.
58
 
 But despite the evident grief, the Czechs insisted – prided themselves – on emotional 
restraint.  Speaking on the wireless after Syrový, the Commander-in-Chief of the Czech Army 
appealed to the people „not to be led by sentiment‟.59  The New York Times specifically 
contrasted Czech behaviour with the frenzy of Hitler‟s Nuremberg speech: 
The self-control and calm nerves that have characterised the Czech attitude ever since 
the Austrian invasion started this crisis were maintained throughout this very critical 
day.
60
 
 
The Times reported that in response to rioting by the Sudeten Nazis, the Czech police 
„behaved with extraordinary patience and restraint‟.61  „Love and trust in justice give us a kind 
of icy calm,‟ said the poet, Josef Hora on 20 September, „hundreds of thousands of our young 
people are growing up, and their presence gives us the strength to be calm.  They sing our 
national anthem with different intonation, more wisely, more seriously, with more endurance 
than us.‟62  Mobilisation on 23 September was done with „no fuss.  Everything was 
businesslike, quick‟.63  Mothers, quietly crying, blessed their sons and with simple, moving 
words exhorted them not to be frightened.
64
  Author and playwright Karel Čapek, writing in 
Lidove Noviny on 25 September described it thus: „quietly, quickly, the men go […] all 
impassive, calm, without alarm.  It is as though they are simply going to work.‟65  Ripka 
emphasises it again and again: „in no place was there any trace of the usual bellicose hysteria, 
                                                 
58
 Henderson, Eyewitness in Czechoslovakia, 230. 
59
 Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 641. 
60
 „Sudetens Excited, Czechs Are Firm‟, 14. 
61
 “In Prague,” Times, 17 September 1938, 10. 
62
 Quoted in Ripka, “Praga,” 118. 
63
 Joan Griffin and Jonathan Griffin, Lost Liberty? The Ordeal of the Czechs and the Future of 
Freedom (London: Chatto & Windus, 1939), 85. 
64
 Ripka, “Praga,” 93. 
65
 Quoted in Ripka, “Praga,” 94-5. 
 12 
in no place was the usual howl of fanatical nationalism or the hatred of racism […]  The 
people followed developments with noteworthy calm and exemplary sang-froid.‟66 
Even when the news that the Anglo-French proposals had been accepted was broken 
to the populace, „there was no violence, no stone-throwing or fighting‟, just a „quiet, slow 
movement of people‟.67  The Agrarian party paper, Večer, called for „calm, iron calm and 
careful order!  Nerves like steel cables!‟68  „Each one of us Czechs will always be proud of 
these our people,‟ said Ripka, „because they acted with a full sense of dignity in the most 
terrible moments when desperation was unleashed […] the grief was too deep to be profaned 
by a hysterical rage.‟69  The letter from Jan Masarýk to Chamberlain and Halifax rejecting the 
Godesberg Memorandum used national forbearance to justify the country‟s political stance on 
the ultimatum: 
The Czech people have shown a unique discipline and self-restraint in the last few 
weeks regardless of the unbelievably coarse and vulgar campaign of the controlled 
German press and radio against Czechoslovakia and its leaders, especially M. 
Beneš.70 
 
In the following days, there was in the country, Ripka noted, „exceptional calm‟.71  Syrový, in 
his post-Munich broadcast, though expressing the strongest feelings, appealed to everyone „to 
maintain a perfect equilibrium between thought and action‟.72  The Czech Prime Minister, 
according to Alexander Henderson, „spoke tersely, with the dry firmness of a soldier‟.73  His 
words were heeded.  „The streets of Prague were full of sobbing crowds,‟ recorded Ripka, 
„groaning without end. […]  But all the same the crowd was disciplined, it felt instinctively 
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that in these tragic hours dissidence and anarchy must not insinuate themselves between the 
lines of the Czech people.‟74 
 Such emotional restraint was, in particular, personified in the Czech President 
Edouard Beneš.  The FCO official who presented the Anglo-French proposals to him reported 
to Halifax that Beneš had been „greatly moved and agitated‟.  Nevertheless, he spoke „with 
self-control‟.75  His words were „dry‟ according to G. J. George: „he aim[ed] at convincing by 
force of argument rather than by persuasive tactics‟.76  Hubert Ripka recorded that, when the 
decision was made to accept the proposals, Beneš „could only with the greatest difficulty 
conceal […] his overwhelming despair.  In a voice which could scarcely be heard, he said to 
us, “we have been disgracefully betrayed.”‟77  Broadcasting on 22 September, the President 
told the people: 
I am watching every development calmly and without fear […]  Let us be patient 
then, and wait, with our strength unweakened and undisturbed by internal conflict 
[…] or by excitement and passion.  […] I see things clearly and I have my plan.  […] 
Be calm and manly in this crisis.  […] Let us preserve our mental equilibrium.  To-
day we need it more than ever before.
78
 
  
Speaking again on the radio after his resignation on 5 October, Beneš reminded the nation: 
„with composure and with calm, we confront our fate‟.79 
 For the Czechs, composure – Hora‟s „different intonation‟ – was not just instinctive.  
It was also a political tactic, deployed in the belief that calmness and reasonableness would 
win international friends and face down Hitlerian tirades.  The tactic went deeper than 
stylistic difference.  Beneš, wrote Ripka, categorically refused to turn his back on France [in 
favour of soliciting help from the Soviet Union] because he was convinced not only of the 
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material strength of the western democracies, but also of their „ethical‟ superiority.80  
Restraint and rationality „spoke‟ to those ethics, which were essentially those of civilised 
people.  It is a point emphasised by the socialist writer Storm Jameson in her 1940 novel, 
Europe to Let.  What incendiary National Socialism threatened to destroy, and must therefore 
be countered by, she intimated, was nothing less than western civilisation.   
 
 For the British, or, at least, for Neville Chamberlain, Czechoslovakia was, famously, 
„a faraway country of whom we know nothing‟.81  „How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is,‟ 
said the Prime Minister, whose reluctance to go to war (the result of his First World War 
experiences) amounted virtually to a phobia,
82
 „that we should be digging trenches and trying 
on gas-masks here‟ because of a quarrel in that remote place.83  This sense of geographical 
distance was recapitulated in the stylistic „distance‟, or detachment, which characterised the 
government‟s policy of appeasement.  This was not Czech composure but British 
understatement or diffidence (even indifference: the Daily Mail commented „Czechoslovakia 
is not of the remotest concern to us‟, under the headline „Czechs Not Our Business‟).84  At 
Heston airport, before flying to Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain spoke in a „clipped, unemotional 
voice‟85 (though on his return from Munich, „a new lightness‟ was observed about the Prime 
Minister.  „He was not tense‟ and „his words […] were casual this time, and not so 
measured.‟).86      
It was perceived by many that the British voice would prove a steadying influence.  
The Times‟ Berlin correspondent reported that the Germans hoped that the conference at 
Berchtesgaden would be „conducted on the British side in a spirit of “realism”‟.87  Their hopes 
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were apparently realised: Sir Horace Wilson of the FCO noted at Berchtesgaden that 
„Schmidt, the interpreter, who is probably a good judge of Hitler, said “What impressed Hitler 
most was Mr. Chamberlain‟s directness and clarity of thought and speech; he likes that.”‟88 A 
farcical incongruity of styles is evoked by the FCO documents of the meeting: 
Herr Hitler made gestures and exclamations of disgust and impatience. […]  Sir 
Horace Wilson said that he must emphasise again that the Prime Minister fully 
appreciated Herr Hitler‟s feelings and his insistence on speed, but the fact was that it 
was the way in which the proposals were to be carried out which had shocked and 
roused British opinion.
89
 
 
Tactful FCO-speak here is not only comical but actually gives the impression of an anti-
dialogue in which the problem of communication is not simply that of two foreign languages.  
As Duff Cooper acidly remarked, Hitler was told at Berchtesgaden that Britain was prepared 
to fight „through the mouth of a distinguished English civil servant. […]  We know that a 
message delivered strictly according to instructions with at least three qualifying clauses was 
not likely to produce on him […] the effect that was desired‟.90  The Times itself was 
congratulated by readers on the tone of its coverage of events.  One Algernon Cecil of 
Bryanston Square SW1, conflating „objectivity‟ with „lack of emotion‟, wrote commending 
„the objectivity with which you have treated the crisis‟: „that objectivity, rather than more 
emotional or nervous reactions, may well be anticipating the “verdict of history”.‟91  A 
Sydney King-Farlow of Concarneau agreed: „we have a reputation for keeping our heads in 
times of crisis […] we can rely on our Press to set an example of prudent restraint‟.92  
Carefully-moderated tones were therefore equated with a steady-as-she-goes political 
approach. 
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Negotiation was Chamberlain‟s preferred tactic.  He presented himself as a 
mediator,
93
 thereby laying claim to a disinterested position which allowed maximum 
detachment.  But Alexander Henderson argues that Prague‟s acceptance of the Anglo-French 
proposals was hardly achieved by „mediation‟: „in language that was far from diplomatic, 
with much stamping and banging on the table, Dr. Beneš was bullied into surrender.‟94  By 
1963, A. J. P. Taylor could write that Munich was „a triumph for all that was best and most 
enlightened in British life,‟95 realigning honour from its association with Czech dignity to 
conflate it with Chamberlainesque diplomacy.  This diplomacy, negotiation, reasonableness 
was the quiet murmur, the „word in your ear‟, amongst the other voices of the Munich Pact.  
The lasting aural image, indeed, is of a mouth with no sound coming out: the British Prime 
Minister yawning visibly as the Czechs were informed of their losses at Munich.
96
     
 
 But Chamberlain‟s was not the only British voice of the Munich Pact.  „To English 
ears, the name of Czechoslovakia sounds outlandish,‟ Winston Churchill told the Commons 
on 14 March 1938, „but still they are a virile people, they have their rights.‟97  A faraway 
country then, Churchill agreed, but one of whom Britain might want to know rather more.  
The Churchillian growl sounded throughout the crisis, advocating plain speaking, the case for 
re-armament and the advantages of involving the Soviet Union.
98
  „It is most necessary that 
nations should declare plainly where they stand,‟ he told the House of Commons on 14 March 
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1938.
99
  (A correspondent to the Times made the same point: „I am sorry to have to write in 
this strain, but the times and The Times call for plain speaking.‟)100  Churchill‟s praise for 
Chamberlain‟s announcement of the Austrian Anschluss was a piece of literary criticism.  
Since the war, he said in Parliament, he could not remember hearing „a statement so 
momentous, so expressed in language of rigid restraint but giving the feeling of iron 
determination behind it.‟101  As the Prime Minister‟s „iron determination‟ appeared to buckle, 
Churchill responded with Certeauesque tactics.  „My contacts with Her Majesty‟s 
Government became more frequent and intimate with the mounting of the crisis,‟ he later 
recalled:
102
 evoking an impression of subtle interventions and attempts at persuasion.  He was 
„highly agitated‟, according to his biographer, Roy Jenkins, „trying to exercise an influence 
[…] which he did not really possess‟: though he had full access to the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary, they took no notice of his advice.
103
  Duff Cooper found him in „a state of 
great excitement […] violent in his denunciations of the Prime Minister.‟104  The outcome of 
Munich actually affected Churchill‟s voice.  Colin Coote, later Daily Telegraph editor, wrote 
of him being „in a towering rage and a deepening gloom. […]  One could always tell when he 
was deeply moved, because a minor defect to his palate gave an echoing timbre to his voice.  
On this occasion it was not an echo, but a supersonic boom.‟105  From the failure of plain 
speaking, then, came a noise that seemed to break the sound barrier. 
 Plain speaking was the issue over which Duff Cooper himself resigned as First Lord 
of the Admiralty.  Cooper opened his resignation speech in the Commons by describing his 
sense of emotional remoteness from the cheering crowds who hailed Chamberlain at 
Downing Street.  „There is no greater feeling of loneliness than to be in a crowd of happy, 
cheering people,‟ he said, „and to feel that there is no occasion for oneself for gaiety or for 
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cheering.‟106  Cooper‟s emotional isolation contrasted with his interventionist politics.  Again, 
these were embodied in a plea for „unequivocal‟ language.107  In foreign relations, he noted, 
he had always believed the most important thing was „to make your policy plain to other 
countries, to let them know where you stand and what in certain circumstances you are 
prepared to do.‟108  He was even more specific about the kind of utterance which the 
circumstances demanded.  Guarded speech was „not the language which the dictators 
understand‟:   
Together with new methods and a new morality they have introduced a new 
vocabulary into Europe […]  They talk a new language, the language of the headlines 
of the tabloid Press, and such guarded diplomatic and reserved utterances as were 
made by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer mean nothing to the 
mentality of Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini.
109
                  
 
„A new vocabulary‟, „a new language‟: this conjures up an anti-dialogue of the untranslatable.  
He had been advocating mobilisation of the fleet, Cooper continued, because he „had thought 
that this was the kind of language which would be easier for Herr Hitler to understand than 
the guarded language of diplomacy or the conditional clauses of the Civil Service.‟110  Hitler‟s 
was the discourse of „bluff, blather and blackmail.‟111  A „deep difference‟ had opened up 
between himself and the Prime Minister, Cooper concluded: „the Prime Minister has believed 
in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness.  I have believed that 
he was more open to the language of the mailed fist.‟112  Language (or, at least, language-as-
metaphor) therefore lay at the heart of Cooper‟s attitude to Munich.  But, it is important to 
note, the voices of the Munich pact were not simply those of sweet reasonableness, incendiary 
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blather, disciplined restraint and plain speaking.  Cooper and Churchill introduced another, 
signifier-less, tongue: action without words. 
    
 „A nation which has adopted neutrality as a religion has no right to an opinion on 
certain questions of the day,‟ thinks the narrator, Esk, when an American journalist begins to 
criticise the Czechs in Storm Jameson‟s anti-Munich novel, Europe to Let (1940).113  Non-
intervention does not only equate with silence in this view, but must be confined to it.  The 
American voices of the Munich Pact vary between the strident and the tentative.  The former 
call with increasing volume for involvement.  The latter are less audible: lower-pitched and 
hesitant. 
 Dorothy Thompson was the first American correspondent to be expelled from Nazi 
Germany.  She was described by Helen Kirkpatrick as „an exceptionally well-informed 
journalist‟114 and by the war correspondent Martha Gellhorn as „terribly tough‟.115  On 1 
October 1938, Thompson made an NBC radio broadcast in which she excoriated the „fantastic 
piece of paper‟ that was Munich.116  The Accord had been reached by four men who did not 
understand each other‟s language.  Thompson ended with a redefinition: „it is not peace – but 
the initiation of a terrific world crisis.‟  Another American journalist whose voice resonated 
was Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Berlin correspondent of the Chicago Daily News and author of an 
anti-German Penguin Special, Germany Puts the Clock Back (reprinted five times between 
December 1937 and April 1938).  In Paris, Storm Jameson had lunch with Mowrer and 
Kirkpatrick, who gave her their opinion that the democracies were not moving fast enough 
against Hitler.  When Mowrer informed her that, „you [Britain] threw away your last chance 
to trip up Master Hitler two years ago,‟ Jameson felt „a sudden uprush of fury,117 irritated by 
Mowrer‟s apparently hypocritical failure to criticise American neutrality.  Mowrer‟s views on 
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Britain and France again centre on politico-stylistics.  Czechoslovakia, he wrote, had been 
betrayed „by Englishmen‟s deliberate reflection; by Frenchmen in an hour of panic.‟  A kind 
of discursive screen had been erected, a „shelter‟ of „specious explanations‟.  Chamberlain 
and Daladier had not handed over the Sudetens to Germany because they were „oppressed‟, 
but „because Hitler shouted and banged on the table‟.  Neither would stand up to a „blustering 
dictator‟.118 
 Mowrer‟s views were shared by his colleague Helen Kirkpatrick, correspondent for 
the New York Tribune, the Chicago Daily News and the New York Post.  In her 
autobiography, Storm Jameson records a similar reaction to that provoked in her by Mowrer 
when Kirkpatrick says: 
The time has come for your government to send another questionnaire to Berlin.  It 
should run: Now that we have given you Czechoslovakia, how can we help you to (a) 
Poland (b) anything else you want?  Which bit of the Empire would you like first?
119
 
 
At this, Jameson feels „insane rage‟, no longer wanting to listen to the American Kirkpatrick‟s 
voice.
120
  Kirkpatrick‟s book on the lead-up to war, This Terrible Peace, was published in 
1939.  It opens with her credentials: „an American journalist resident in England for more 
than a year‟.121  While British journalists must write their stories „from the point of view held 
by the newspaper‟, she explains, in writing for American papers, „one must give as objective 
and factual an account as possible.‟122  Already, then, a battle of styles is announced.  The 
book goes on to give a number of reasons why the United States might be suspicious of 
British motives: Eden‟s resignation; inadequate defences; the failure to end the Sino-Japanese 
War; the failure to act over Abyssinia; the old „balance of power‟ game; the „Cliveden Set‟s‟ 
„peace at any percent‟.123  All these, Kirkpatrick states, make American correspondents 
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„extremely sceptical‟ that Britain will save Czechoslovakia.124  But she does not make a 
strong case for American intervention, except to note the „tremendous interest in European 
affairs displayed by people who had previously seemed scarcely aware of the existence of 
lands outside America.‟125  This is contrasted with the British people who had no „real grasp 
of the course of events and their implications, or possessed the vitality required to alter 
them.‟126  Kirkpatrick‟s anti-British sentiment is repeated in Martha Gellhorn‟s „The Lord 
Will Provide For England‟, a withering attack on complacency.  But it is notable in 
Kirkpatrick‟s case that American public and governmental opinion are treated carefully.  This 
was a moment for tactical persuasion, rather than loud cries for help. 
 The domestic climate in the United States was dominated by isolationism.  The 
Neutrality Acts were in force and the public was, as Barbara Reardon Farnham puts it, at best 
sceptical, at worst hostile to intervention in European affairs.
127
  The aural situation was one 
of uneasy silence, a silence that included the Chief Executive, as the New York Times reported 
on 16 September 1938 under the headline „Roosevelt Alert, Silent on Crisis‟: 
So grave did the President consider the situation that he cancelled tomorrow‟s press 
conference, for fear that any comment he might make there might be 
misinterpreted.
128
  
 
The silence was controlled and therefore suspenseful, in the paper‟s words, „an obvious effort 
to present an appearance of calm‟.129  The day before this article in the New York Times, 
Roosevelt had written in a note to Ambassador William Philips:  
You are right in saying that we are an unemotional people over here in the sense that 
we do not easily lose our heads, but if we get the idea that the future of our form of 
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government is threatened by a coalition of European dictators, we might wade in with 
everything we have to give.
130
 
 
Emotion is the basis of Farnham‟s political analysis of Roosevelt‟s conduct during Munich.  
Comparing analytical, intuitive and motivational decision-making, she notes that the last aims 
to preserve emotional well-being and tends to result in the outcome which produces the least 
stress on the decision-makers involved.
131
  Farnham discerns two phases in Roosevelt‟s 
response to the gathering crisis: from 13-22 September a distinct disinclination to intervene, 
followed by, from 23-30 September, a growing urge to involvement.  What marked the 
turning-point was FDR‟s strong emotional reaction to Bad Godesberg.132  On 24 September, 
he began drafting a message to Hitler, eventually sent at 1 a.m. on 26 September.  Careful not 
to agitate isolationists, the text stated that the U.S. „eschewed political entanglement‟ but 
nonetheless appealed for the crisis to be resolved by „reason‟ rather than „force‟.133  The next 
watershed was Chamberlain‟s radio broadcast on 27 September.  Roosevelt told Arthur 
Murray that the Cabinet had listened to it together.  His account of it makes plain his 
appreciation of the differing modes of discourse: 
When it was finished I looked round the table and there were tears in the eyes of at 
least four members of the Cabinet, and I felt that way myself.  I had listened to Hitler 
on the Monday [26 September at the Berlin Sportspalast], and so had most of my 
Cabinet.  The contrast between the two just bit into us – the shouting and violence of 
Hitler, and the roars, through their teeth, of his audience of „Krieg, krieg,‟ and then, 
the quiet, beautiful statement of Chamberlain‟s.134   
 
Chamberlain‟s „faraway country‟ speech, therefore, had the paradoxical effect of prompting 
intervention on the part of Roosevelt, albeit tentative intervention.  A second message was 
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sent to Hitler at 10.18 p.m. on 27 September, reiterating that the United States had no 
„political involvement in Europe‟ but urged the continuation of negotiations at a neutral spot.  
Americans, said Roosevelt, demanded that „the voice of their government be raised again and 
yet again to avert and to avoid war.‟135 
 Farnham argues that, by 25 September, Roosevelt had „re-framed‟ the decision over 
whether to speak or not, re-casting the possible European war as a loss to the United States.
136
  
As a result, he became a „stake-holder‟, emotionally and therefore politically, switching from 
a passive to an active stance.  In a rich evocation of the textual bustle that was Munich, 
Farnham writes of the President being inundated with „affect-laden communications‟ of 
„increasing vividness, extremity and frequency‟.137  „Strong emotion, then,‟ she concludes, 
„apparently lay behind Roosevelt‟s transformation from a detached observer of the crisis to a 
sort of participant.‟138  The participation – the sending of the two messages – took the form of 
textual intervention.  Roosevelt called it the government‟s voice being raised „again and yet 
again‟. But the official American voice of the Munich Pact was relatively low-pitched, at least 
in comparison to its critics. 
 
It is clear that the different timbres of Munich‟s voices were audible to contemporary 
listeners.  Again and again, British, American, Czech and German commentators remarked 
the differences in pitch and tone that were apparent, differences which went beyond stylistics 
and became, essentially, political.  In Britain, reaction to Munich was varied.  Chamberlain 
was greeted by cheering crowds on his return (one Sir Francis Joseph offered the North 
Staffordshire Royal Infirmary £1,000 to endow a bed in his name),
139
  but those on the Left 
were fiercely critical.  The Guardian reported that the National Unemployed Workers Union 
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had delivered a protest at Chamberlain‟s „coming to terms with Nazi Germany‟140 and the 
Labour Research Department issued a pamphlet claiming that the appeasement relied „on a 
precarious friendship with avowed aggressors and treaty-breakers‟.141  „Glory to God for 
Munich,‟ wrote Louis MacNeice: 
 And stocks go up and wrecks 
Are salved and politicians‟ reputations 
 Go up like Jack-on-the-Beanstalk; only the Czechs 
Go down without fighting.
142
                  
 
As Storm Jameson more enigmatically put it, „a vast no-man‟s land separates truth from the 
rhetoric composed in anguish and good faith by people used to handling words.‟143  
 „History never repeats itself, so anyone looking for parallels between the present 
situation and past events is likely to be disappointed. Not that there has been any shortage of 
such parallels drawn in the past few weeks by politicians seeking to encourage their 
supporters or discredit their opponents,‟ remarked the historian, Richard Evans, when asked 
whether, in his professional opinion, Munich gave comfort to the anti-appeasers supporting 
the Bush-Blair 2003 invasion of Iraq.
144
  The disparities between Nazi Germany and Saddam 
Hussein‟s Iraq suggest, compellingly, that he is right.  Nonetheless, Munich refuses to be 
silenced.  When war is proposed or protested, it calls down the decades – or rather, its many 
voices do, audible to us still.         
 
KATE McLOUGHLIN 
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